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ISRAELI JEWS AND THE PALESTINIAN ARABS: THREE PERSPECTIVES

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The views of Israeli Jews regarding the Palestinian Arabs are hardly monolithic but, whatever their diversity, all flow out of a common wish and a general ambivalence. The common wish which virtually all Israelis share is that the Palestinians would simply go away. It is possible to get many Israelis to articulate this wish when pushed to do so but, needless to say, its very unreality means that it is rarely articulated and, once articulated, is rapidly dismissed from consideration. Nevertheless, it should be noted at the outset because for Israeli Jews every other option, no matter which one they choose, is clearly a poor second.

If that wish existed without the fundamental ambivalence, then one might even conclude that there is a certain symmetry between it and the Palestinians' fervent desire to be rid of the Israelis. But it is the ambivalence that makes the difference. Most Israelis can sympathize with the Palestinian Arabs as human beings and do, even if they cannot take the steps that even moderate Palestinians view as necessary for solving their national problem. Unfortunately, the Palestinians do not seem to be able to do the same vis-a-vis the Jews of Israel.

It has often been remarked that there is a notable lack of hatred toward the Arabs on the part of the Israeli population as a whole. This remains true although it, too, is laced with certain ambivalences. Most expressions of hatred come from teenagers, a group not generally noted for its sensitivity, and in Israel one for whom Arab hostility is a life and death matter. It has been claimed that the Jews who came originally from Arab countries have greater hostility toward the Arabs than those who did not. In fact, there, too, feelings are ambivalent. On one hand, there are those who bitterly recall or have learned from their parents about the hostile attitudes and behavior of Arabs toward the Jews in their midst, but at the same time there is a certain cultural kinship on some level that moderates antagonistic feelings. Similarly, it has been suggested that Israeli Jews of European or American backgrounds have fewer negative feelings toward the Arabs. This seems to be true on the political level, but is accompanied by a certain very real distaste for Arab culture as foreign and unappealing.

Needless to say, the biggest ambivalence of all is not in the Israeli Jews' recognition of the Palestinian Arabs' humanity, which is not a problem, but in how the Israelis perceive the reality of Palestinian existence and legitimacy of

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the Palestinians' search for a place in the sun. The Israeli Jews correctly perceive that the Palestinian Arabs as a group are an uncompromising element, sworn to the elimination of Israel and its Jewish population however much they may sugarcoat the issue for political purposes. The Jews see the Palestinians as a group that is not prepared to recognize reality and to share in a land which now contains two peoples, whatever the historic situation in the immediate past.

Most Israelis are additionally ambivalent about the fact that, as Jews, they do not like the role of conqueror, occupier, suppressor of a national movement, or whatever, but as Israelis they must be concerned with their security vis-a-vis an apparently implacable foe. This view is widely shared in Israel and is as much a part of the outlook of those most committed supporters to making maximum concessions to the Arabs as well as the "hardliners." Only their efforts to deal with the problem are different.

If Israeli policy vis-a-vis the Palestinian Arabs and the territories in which they reside has not always been clear-cut, and indeed it has not, that is a reflection of the depth of the ambivalences among Israeli Jews which affect the highest governmental circles as well as the person in the street. They often have served as a paralyzing factor in Israeli policy-making (at least until the Begin government), a factor that has been brought no nearer to resolution by the actions of the Palestinians themselves.

Beyond these shared ambivalences, there are three historic approaches to the problem of the Arabs in the Land of Israel which, while no longer tenable in view of developments since 1967, have strongly influenced the thinking of policy-makers in the past and continue to do so today. In this essay we will explore the three historic positions, their collapse and the resulting situation since 1967 and today.

The Zionist Vision Divides Into Three

It has often been suggested that the original Zionists utterly ignored the Arabs in their eager pursuit of Jewish national revival in the ancient homeland. At the very least, this is a great oversimplification and in most respects it is simply not true. With a few exceptions, all the early Zionist leaders make clear reference to the indigenous population and many even suggest directly or obliquely what relations between the returning Jews and the indigenously settled Arabs should be. What the Zionist movement failed to note, again with few exceptions, was Arab nationalism, developing parallel to Jewish nationalism. As nineteenth century Europeans, the Zionists saw the indigenous population as essentially passive. Indeed, beginning with Herzl if not before, they saw the Zionist enterprise as raising the Arabs as individuals out of backwardness and passivity into an active role in the new Jewish society. Herzl provides the classic model of this view in his utopian novel Altneuland.

It was not until the 1920s when the facts of Arab nationalism were brutally brought home to the Jews in Palestine and the Zionist movement that any effort was made to revise Zionist thinking. Indeed it is one of the tragedies of the history of the Zionist enterprise that the Zionist leaders who negotiated the beginnings of the Jewish national home in Palestine after the Balfour Declaration and the British conquest of the land during World War I were so utterly unaware of the national aspirations of the indigenous Arabs that they preferred to leave dealing with the native population to the British. They did so against the advice of the indigenous Jewish notables, mostly of Sephardic background, who had governed

the Jewish community for centuries under the Turks, knew their Arab neighbors, and understood what was happening. For obvious reasons, the Zionists were quite willing to recognize Arab nationalism in other parts of the Middle East, simply hoping that an undivided Arab nationalism would be willing to compromise with Jewish aspirations in Palestine, at least west of the Jordan River.

By the time the local expressions of the national spirit began to make an impression, the Palestinian Arabs had already adopted intractable positions from which they have never receded. The Jewish response at that point was reasonable enough, suggesting that, since the Palestinian Arabs were espousing Arab nationalism and not a separate Palestinian nationalism, they should find their satisfaction in the vast territories of the Arab world, leaving the mere 10,000 square miles of western Palestine (by that time eastern Palestine had been detached from the Jewish national home, renamed TransJordan and launched on the road to becoming Jordan) for the Jews. The indigenous Arab inhabitants would remain as a cultural community rather than as a national collectivity.

What is notable about the early Zionist consideration of the Arabs is that while it may have been tainted with colonist ideas of what native expectations were, it was not colonialist in character. Rather, it looked upon the Arabs as potential citizens, not as hewers of wood and drawers of water. The various ideas that were advanced by Zionist leaders and thinkers and even by ordinary settlers (if such a distinction can be made given the strong intellectual and ideational equipment which even inidvidual settlers brought with them) addressed the issue of how to bring the Arabs into the new Jewish society on an appropriately humane and egalitarian basis. Three general positions were developed in response to this question, one by the Socialist or Labor camp, one by the Revisionists and liberals or what, in Israel, became known as the civil camp, plus that of the religious camp.

The Labor Camp Prepares the Way for Partition

By and large, it may be said that the Labor camp's position was separationist or partitionist in character, for reasons originally having nothing to do with the Arabs.* The Labor camp sought the development of a separate Jewish society in the land. Their interest was in transforming what they saw as the unnatural character of diaspora Jewry into a more natural socio-economic order in which Jews attained self-fulfillment through agricultural and manual labor for themselves rather than being exploiters (in the Socialist sense) of the labor of others. This classic sociálist position led its original exponents, members of the Second Aliya (1904-1913), to engage in bitter battles with the Jewish settlers already in the country over the employment of cheap Arab labor on their farms in place of Jews. Ultimately it led the Labor camp to develop its own institutions, from agriculture settlements to industrial and commercial enterprises, within the framework of what later became the Histadrut.

In their effort to build a Jewish workers society, the Labor camp simply excluded the Arabs without any intended malice. There was no intention to do so to diminish the Arabs' economic opportunities; they simply did not fit into the Labor Zionists' scheme. Thus the Labor parties and their members became separationists and partitionists long before partition became a political option. While there was

*This is true even though the Shomer HaTzair, later the Mapam party, at the left extreme of the Labor Zionist camp, advocated a binational state in the 1930s and early 1940s.

a very serious struggle in the Labor camp as to whether or not to accept the partition of western Palestine, in fact it was relatively easy for them to do so when the time came because their major goal was building a separate Jewish society on socialist principles, a goal that, for most Labor Zionists, was more important than the territorial integrity of the country, especially in light of other considerations, such as the desire for a politically sovereign Jewish state of any reasonable size to save the Jews of Europe.

Since the Labor camp became dominant in the late 1920s and early 1930s, it led the way to partition in 1947-48. In the late stages of Israel's war for independence, when its generals urged Ben Gurion to utilize the by-then superior Israeli military power to extend the borders of the new state into what is now the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Ben Gurion held back, principally because he feared the opposition of the Western powers, but also because he did not want to absorb the Arabs there, and by that time Arabs were no longer fleeing from the Jews. A secure Jewish majority was obviously more important to him than the territory.

This position continued to be held by veteran Labor figures all the way through the post-1967 period but it encountered two major problems. First, while the Jewish majority materialized after 1948 and indeed became a very substantial one in Israel, the Labor commonwealth collapsed both as an idea and a reality. The mass influx of Jews did not bring committed socialist pioneers; quite to the contrary. Moreover, socialism in Israel showed the same difficiencies as it has elsewhere and even the socialist leadership of the country had to modify their policies drastically to cope with new realities.

As Israel moved from socialism to social democracy with an increasingly capitalist base (including state capitalism), at least a major portion of the underpinnings of the old Labor argument for Jewish-Arab separation diminished. Thus, after the Six Day War changed the map of Israel, the second generation of leaders in the Labor camp, dominated by Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres, were not moved by the old partitionist considerations. While they shared the general Jewish ambivalence about acquiring a large Arab minority with a high birth rate, they also saw the necessity (and also had the desire) to maintain the Jewish presence in the occupied territories. Looking for a compromise between outright annexation and repartition -- they supported what they termed a "functional solution" -- they turned a major segment of the Labor camp away from partitionist thinking as simply being no longer practical. Only Yigal Allon tried to find a new basis for a repartition that would solve Israel's security needs and even he, in his last years, came to the conclusion that simple partition was no longer possible.

What was characteristic of men like Allon and Dayan, natives of Israel, was that they personally had developed serious relations with their Arab neighbors, in Allon's case in particular very close ones. Thus their attitude towards the Palestinians was one of openness, ready for friendship as individuals. Still they showed the same ambivalence with regard to the precise relationship that should develop between the two groups.

The collapse of Labor's solid partitionist position in light of the divisions within its range and the abandonment of that position by the post-1967 Labor governments, for all intents and purposes, did not lead to the emergence of a different position but rather to political paralysis. The Labor Party was too divided to take a firm stand in any direction. Their diffidence was reinforced by Arab intransigence which led to the Palestinians' rejection of even

the tentative solutions put forward on a frequent basis by the Labor government. Only after the Likud assumed power did a majority of Labor coalesce behind a repartition of some kind. Peres, by then the party's leader, adopted that position, probably for tactical purposes, so with no great conviction. In the interim changes in military technology have transformed the security situation so that repartition of the territory west of the Jordan becomes increasingly difficult for Israel on a security basis alone.

The Civil Camp Champions Integration and Equal Rights

If the Labor camp fell into a partitionist position for its own reasons, the Revisionists and the Liberals took an integrationist position for their own. As in the former case, it was a matter of combining idealism and self-interest. The original farmers of the First Aliyah (1880-1895) and their heirs plus many Jews in the urban areas employed Arab labor as a matter of course, because of the economic advantages involved. They opposed socialist Zionist demands to employ Jewish labor exclusively and hence became economic integrationists willy nilly, although like all other Jews and Arabs they saw the two peoples as otherwise maintaining national and cultural separation.

The Revisionists, on the other hand, envisioned a unified country with Arabs and Jews having equal civil rights as the basis for maintaining the unity of Eretz Israel. As nineteenth century nationalists, they were committed to a Jewish state in all of historic Eretz Israel and as nineteenth century liberal democrats, they could not justify such a state even in their own minds unless all of its citizens had equal rights. That is why they emphasized the rapid creation of a Jewish majority in the land through mass migration so that the extension of civil rights to Jew and Arab alike would not interfere with the building of a Jewish national home. This principle was so important to them that it became part of their party anthem whose central theme is a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan, in which Arabs and Jews, Muslims and Christians all are equal citizens.

The Herut Party, their heirs and the dominant element in the Likud, has remained thoroughly consistent in its commitment to this position. It can be seen in Menachem Begin's proposal of autonomy as a prelude to full Israeli absorption of the West Bank on the basis of civil equality for its Arab inhabitants. He said as much in his original proposal of December 1977, a month after Anwar Sadat's first visit to Jerusalem, and he and his supporters have reiterated this position regularly, whenever appropriate.

The integrationist position foundered on the rock of Arab nationalism. The Arabs wanted no part of equal rights in a state with a Jewish majority; they wanted to maintain their Arab majority and keep the Jews out. Thus, they did not accept the Revisionist position in the past and they do not accept it today. The Likud government presses on with its absorption policies and finds no takers among the Palestinian Arabs beyond the 1949 armistice lines.

The Religious Camp Ignores the Arabs

By and large, the characteristic position of the Religious camp was to ignore the Palestinian Arabs as an issue or a problem. Preoccupied as they were with forging a place for themselves within the Zionist movement or bringing Zionism into the sphere of religiously sanctioned behavior, they had little to say about

the Arabs, except where circumstances brought them into contact and where ad hoc responses prevailed. Otherwise, the religious socialists followed the general position of the Labor camp and the non-Socialist religious Zionists, that of the civil camp.

Inattention was a feasible stance as long as the religious community did not have to deal with the Arab problem in other than an ad hoc way, nor did it until after 1967. The arguments over partition in the 1930s and 1940s were based upon the question of whether or not to insist on all of historic Palestine or to compromise in order to get at least some kind of Jewish state. The Arab question barely figured. Between 1948 and 1967, the religious camp, like the other camps, rarely came into contact with the Arab minority in the country (except in pre-election negotiations between political leaders).

After 1967, however, there was a radical transformation, with members of the religious community coming into what was perhaps the greatest contact with the Palestinian Arabs of the administered territories. This drastic change took on several aspects. One was the issue of settlement on the West Bank where members of the religious camp were leaders. First came the reestablishment of the Etzion Bloc of settlements, which had been Religious Zionist settlements before 1948 but under quite different circumstances. Then there was the resettlement of Hebron and the establishment of Jewish right of access to the shared religious shrines there. Finally, there is the predominantly (but not exclusively) religious Gush Emunim with its efforts to extend Jewish settlements into every part of the territories. Day-to-day contact of an intense kind came in Jerusalem where religious Jews, even more than others, were attracted to the Western Wall and other places of historic and religious association in the old city.

Since the religious community led the way, or was among the leaders of the settlement in those areas, whether through the actual implantation of settlements or the establishment of yeshivot, or marches and demonstrations on behalf of settlement, their contact with the Arabs grew and intensified. By and large, it was an antagonistic contact based upon the fact that the Jewish vanguard came into conflict with Arab claims and rejected them. The religious camp as such is divided on the issue of the future of the territories. Most share the Begin view of finding some way to hold onto them but many of the most orthodox are quite willing to withdraw even from historic holy sites for real peace. There is a very small handful of extremists, by no means all religious, who would like to see the Arabs expelled from the land but they do not represent the religious camp as such. At the same time, the religious mainstream has a hard time accepting the mass of Palestinian Arabs absorbed as equal citizens, not because they reject civil equality for Arabs, which they do not, but because they are concerned about the Jewish character of the state. A large significant segment of the religious community, particularly from the religious socialist parties, share the Labor camp view that since the Palestinian Arabs also have legitimate claims, partition in some form leading to the separation of the two communities is the best way to enable both to maintain their respective national characteristics and personalities. In any case, the original position of the religious camp has collapsed because it is no longer possible for them to ignore the Arabs and still achieve their goals as Jews and Zionists.

The Situation Since the Six Day War

In the aftermath of partition the Labor camp not only maintained control of the government of the new Jewish state, but its position became the actual Israeli position vis-a-vis the Palestinian Arabs. The self-induced mass exodus of Arabs

from the territory of the new Jewish state strengthened this policy as a natural one. Had there been a very large Arab minority scattered throughout the country perhaps Israeli Jews would have to confront the existence of the Palestinian Arabs in a different way. In fact almost all of the new state was left free of Arabs after 1948 while those Arabs who did not flee were concentrated in the Galilee, particularly in its central and western portions where there were few Jews. Hence a natural geographic separation reinforced other factors making for a separationist solution. Moreover the remaining Arabs tended to be rural peasants, hence there was little economic contact between the two groups.

The Labor-dominated Israeli government pursued a policy of securing the Arabs' group cultural rights through encouraging them to organize municipalities under their own leaders, providing them with schools in which Arabic was the principal language of instruction, and providing state support for their religious institutions insofar as they wished to take advantage of it. Thus, over nearly two decades, a separate Arab society developed within Israel which had little contact with the Jews, permitting the latter to virtually ignore the former except in matters of formal government.

At the same time, the Arabs did become citizens of Israel with equivalent civil rights, including the right to vote in Israeli elections and, indeed, elected a proportionate share of members of the Knesset, a fact guaranteed by the existence of an electoral system based on proportional representation. Even here the separationist position was maintained through the organization of separate Arab parties, most of which were sponsored by or came under the protection of the mainstream Zionist parties of the Labor camp where the Arabs could pursue their own political advantage by linking with the government coalition. The only integrated political party was the Communist Party which stood outside of the Zionist movement. It won the largest share of the Arab vote for that reason and had few Jewish members, only a handful of dedicated Communists who dominated the leadership. Although the Arabs probably had more in common ideologically with the parties of the civil camp, there was no advantage to them in affiliating with what were obviously minority parties unlikely to even become part of the governing coalition much less lead a government. Perhaps surprisingly, the National Religious Party also developed a modest but significant base of support in the Arab sector.

Those Palestinians not within the boundaries of the state were viewed as refugees held hostage by the Arab states in which they found themselves and/or as terrorists seeking the destruction of Israel. In the former capacity, Israelis took pity upon them but saw their condition as being perpetuated by an Arab world seeking to foster hatred of Israel. In the latter case, they were simply enemies to be fought with every possible means.

All of this has to be seen in a context in which the Jews, like the rest of the world for that matter, never saw the Palestinians as a separate entity, certainly not as a separate entity within the Arab world. Palestinians, for them, were just like all other Arabs, only they happened to have lived in Palestine. While the more sophisticated Israeli Jews did understand that there were cultural and even linguistic differences between Palestinians, Egyptians, Syrians, Iraqis, or whatever, and students of the matter knew of the religious sectarianism within Islam, it was an accepted axiom that Arabs were Arabs.

This view was as characteristic of the Arabs as of non-Arabs. Indeed, the only argument one heard in the Arab world was whether the national spirit should

be developed in the direction of Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islam, Christian Arabs, including the Palestinians among them, advocated Pan-Arabism and resisted Pan-Islam for obvious reasons.

As long as the Arabs of Palestine were struggling against the Zionists alone, they did not particularly foster a separate Palestinian identity. That identity, to the extent that it exists, was forged in the aftermath of the creation of Israel, principally as a Palestinian response to their confrontation with their Arab brethren in the Arab states of the Middle East, as much, if not more than as a result of their confrontation with Israel.

The Palestinians' sense of being outsiders, of being supported with lip service but rejected in reality by their fellow Arabs, has created what elsewhere I have termed a Palestinian "public," that is to say, a body of people tied together by common inter-generational interests based upon shared externalities and a common vital issue. The final impetus for the emergence of this public came in the aftermath of the Six Day War. The Palestinians, who up to that time had been moving to integrate themselves within Jordan (which, after all, was and is a Palestinian state except for its ruling family) suddenly found themselves divided territorially between an east bank which remained under Hussein's rule and the west bank which had been occupied by Israel as a result of a disastrous war. They also confronted an Arab world that at the very least was ambivalent toward them.

Given the relatively late emergence of a shared identity among the Palestinians, it is no wonder that Israeli Jews have taken even longer to recognize anything separately Palestinian. Golda Meir, for example, refused to recognize any Palestinian public, much less a Palestinian people, throughout her term as Prime Minister, arguing openly and forcefully against the existence of any such thing. During those years, her view was shared by a majority of Israelis. Nor was it easy to disabuse them of such a view, given the fact that the refugee camps swarmed with non-Palestinians who had acquired refugee identity cards in order to gain the benefits of United Nations relief efforts, while the terrorist organizations actively recruited non-Palestinians for their missions as readily as Palestinians.

While many Israelis today are at least grudgingly willing to recognize some sense of "Palestinian-ness" among the Arabs in the territories or those who trace their roots to western Palestine, most remain quite skeptical of the long-range survival of such an identity. Many view the claim made by the Palestinians and other Arabs as a tactical maneuver designed to evoke world sympathy for yet another Arab state in historic Eretz Israel (there already is Jordan) without any basis in national realities. On the other hand, Palestinian persistence in proclaiming a collective identity has had its effect on Israeli opinion to the point where even Prime Minister Begin speaks of "Palestinian Arabs." If Israeli Jews do not have a firm "fix" on what is a Palestinian or whether being one is more than a temporary expedient, they are not that different from the Palestinians themselves, only the Israelis have a greater interest in moving cautiously toward any recognition of Palestinian identity as well as a greater skepticism with regard to it.

The aftermath of the Six Day War brought with it an influx of Palestinian Arabs into the Israeli economy and an influx of Israelis, visitors or settlers, into Arab territory. Contacts were established where none had existed before.

For Israelis, these contacts were seen as basically non-commital. The Palestinian Arabs were there. They had to live so it was reasonable to do business with them and to employ them so that they would have jobs. The territories were there and, since they had strategic, historic, and religious value, it was good to settle parts of them where strategic, historic, or religious considerations were involved. By and large, however, the two populations continued to go in their own respective directions.

Since the Israelis did not face up to a final disposition of the territories, they paid relatively little attention to the final relationship between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, except for those who persisted in the old positions. Thus, the Likud, emphasizing that Israel was in the territories to stay, also emphasized the necessity to bring the Palestinian Arabs into the polity as individual citizens, although it should be noted that Begin did not insist upon any particular course of action to do so while he was in the government between 1967 and 1970. The old line Labor activists opposed retention of the densely populated parts of the territories on the grounds that the increase in Arab population would drastically dilute and perhaps even end the Jewish majority. They also feared that the transfer of most of the less attractive jobs in society from Jewish to Arab hands would be demoralizing for the Jewish population and a violation of the principles upon which socialist Zionism was built.

Neither of these groups dominated the government, which remained in the hands of "pragmatists" who avoided making strategic decisions, although they pursued practical goals that led to the integration of the territories into the Israeli economic and security systems. The principal Israeli leaders, like those of so much of the rest of the world in the 1960s and 1970s, were ultra-pragmatic in the sense of avoiding actions deliberately directed towards the achievement of ideological goals. The result was ad hoc decisions without ever having a defined long range policy in the hope that such decisions would ultimately lead to conditions through which an appropriate policy could be framed.

Between 1967 and 1973, while Israel had the upper hand in the region, the inhabitants of the administered territories were relatively quiescent. Hence the pragmatists' policy continued unchallenged and even seemed to be working. After the Yom Kippur War, it had to change and, with it, so did Israeli attitudes towards the Palestinian Arabs. The latter began to resist any extension of the Israeli presence with new-found confidence and the world began to press Israel to recognize the Palestinians as a people with legitimate national rights.

With its victory in the 1977 elections, the Likud undertook to fulfill its vision that the territories be absorbed within Israel as a matter of historic, military, and religious necessity. As world pressure and local resistance grew, supporters of the Likud policy became more desperate to implant a Jewish presence in those territories. At the same time, the Israeli government became more desperate to seek a way out as American pressure for an agreement increased. Out of this came the first Israeli recognition that the Palestinian Arabs did have some kind of an identity, though with no clear cut understanding, or willingness to reach an understanding, as to precisely what that identity was. As suggested above, there was no reason to expect the Israelis to have a clearer sense of Palestinian identity than did the Palestinians. On the other hand, Israeli unwillingness to absorb a population whose hostility was becoming increasingly overt made it impossible for them to simply reject a separate Palestinian identity in favor of the old Revisionist approach either.

The end result of this is a continued murkiness coupled with a desire not only to have their cake and eat it too, but to avoid defining the cake. The Labor Party has returned to a partitionist position, the so-called Jordanian option, but without much conviction particularly since there has been nothing forthcoming from Jordan. And even they would like to define that option in such a way that Israel would retain military control of the territories and Jordan gain only civilian rule. It is assumed that there will continue to be economic integration. This certainly does not square with Palestinian demands for self-determination. "Peace Now," the movement of "doves" which emerged in opposition to the policies of the present government at the time of the Israel-Egyptian peace negotiations and which is heavily identified with the Labor Camp, shares that camp's partitionist views. Significantly, even those who came out of the binational orientation of Mapam are now partitionists.

The Likud remains firmly integrationist but few within its ranks can have many delusions that the Palestinians are content to be simply individual citizens of a Jewish Israel without expressing any national identity of their own other than their Arabness.

The Religious are divided between those who see the preservation of the Jewishness of the state as requiring repartition and those who see the achievement of the Jewish national-religious vision as requiring continued Jewish control of the territories. As a result, they spread over the spectrum of perceptions, ranging from a position which holds that the Palestinians, whatever they are, represent a non-Jewish threat to the Jewishness of the state and therefore their areas should be separated from it, to those who support the notion of civil equality for all, as long as the Jews can settle wherever they wish in Eretz Israel, to those few who see the Palestinians as implacable enemies who must be controlled or expelled.

For all of the above and for those who do not have clear position on the issue, a clear Israeli national consensus remains--no separate Palestinian state west of the Jordan, no recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the spokesman for the Palestinians whoever they might be, no Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, and no redivision of Jerusalem. Any and every Israeli government must not only confront that consensus but will reflect it.

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