Iran’s Negotiation Method: Between Ideology and Economic Reality

• Iran’s apparent return to the negotiating table with the United States does not necessarily indicate a true policy shift. It is likely a survival tactic, not a strategic transformation.

• In October 2025, key provisions of the 2015 nuclear agreement will expire:

  1. The end of restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programwill officially allow Iran to develop long-range missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
  2. The end of the ban on development, procurement, and testing of advanced uranium enrichment technologieswill give Iran full legitimacy to develop an industrial infrastructure for very rapid enrichment.
  3. The end of limits on civilian nuclear tradewill allow Iran to purchase equipment, export knowledge, and develop “civilian” nuclear programs on a significant scale, with little realistic oversight.
• If these clauses expire without renewal or a new arrangement, the world will wake up to a reality where there are no longer significant legal obstacles preventing Iran from building a military nuclear infrastructure within mere weeks.
• Additionally, lifting the restrictions will affect Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and possibly Egypt, who will see it as a green light to restart independent nuclear programs. The nuclear race in the Middle East will become overt, loud, and dangerous.
• Within this whole dynamic, Israel may find itself in real danger. If a new nuclear deal is reached that is only slightly better than its predecessor, the result could be a real existential threat to Israel and a victory for the Iran-led axis.

On one of the hot summer evenings of 1993, in a small town in Iran’s Kerman province, a meeting between two rival tribes over water rights dragged on. The mediator, Sheikh Musa al-Husseini, sat in silence for hours, sipping tea and observing both sides, who nearly came to physical blows. Only at three in the morning, after countless gestures, repeated proposals, curses, insults, and another round of especially strong tea, did the tribal leaders sign an agreement. Sheikh Musa smiled and said the well-known Persian proverb:

“آب را گل‌آلود کن تا ماهی بگیری”

“Muddy the waters – and you’ll be able to catch the fish.”

This proverb, commonly used by many Iranians, characterizes the Iranian negotiation method: not necessarily to reach an agreement quickly, but rather to exhaust, to obscure, to go in circles, and ultimately – to catch the fish. But unlike Sheikh Musa, the Iranian leadership today finds itself at a breaking point – economically, geopolitically, and socially. Yet despite this reality, the leadership in Tehran continues to cling to a rigid jihadist ideology that dictates its agenda, even at a heavy cost.

Poverty, Sanctions, and Drought: Iran as a Suffocating State

Let’s begin with economic reality. Iran is now in its fourth consecutive year of drought, with severe water shortages in many cities. Agriculture – once an economic base for over 30 percent of the rural population – is collapsing. Double-digit inflation has become routine, and the rial (local currency) hits new record lows every month.

About 1.8 million barrels of oil are sold per day, roughly 85 percent of them to China, at reduced prices and under sanction-evasion conditions. According to Western estimates, around 50 percent of these revenues go directly to the Revolutionary Guards – a powerful military-economic body that is also the regime’s main internal repression apparatus.

Iran’s economic support to its allies over the last decade has amounted to staggering figures:

• Syria: $30–50 billion (2013–2024)
• Yemen: $1–3 billion (2015–2024)
• Hizbullah: $7–12 billion (2013–2024)

These are mind-boggling amounts relative to Iran’s GDP.

When Ideology Overrides Interest

Why does Iran persist with this policy? The answer lies in the regime’s identity. Since Khomeini’s rise to power, the regime has drawn its legitimacy not just from enforcing Sharia law but also from its militant ideological stance against the West and Israel. Khomeini himself referred to Israel as “the rabid dog of the American master, sent to bite Islam,” and this statement became a visionary compass for many in the Iranian leadership.

Within the leadership, sharp disagreements exist. On one side – hardline generals like Revolutionary Guard commander Hussein Salami and Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri, who support an uncompromising line. On the other – President Pezeshkian and his allies, who are trying to promote a more pragmatic policy and achieve sanctions relief, even at the cost of compromises.

However, even the more moderate factions operate within an ideological-religious framework that does not allow Iran to appear weak in front of the West. The cultural environment, in which masculinity, resilience, and “non-submission” are core values, dictates the regime’s behavior both externally and internally.

Islamic Tradition of Compromise – But Only from Strength

Here enters an important concept from Shi’a Islam: Taqiyya – the idea that a believer may conceal their true faith or act against it if necessary for survival or future benefit to the Muslim nation. Alongside this is a traditional recognition of believers’ weakness, which allows for temporary agreements – even with the “devil” himself – as long as it serves a broader strategic interest.

October 2025 Approaches

In this context, it is important to understand that Iran’s apparent return to the negotiating table with the United States – particularly the effort to restore the 2015 nuclear agreement with minor modifications – does not necessarily indicate a true policy shift. It is likely a survival tactic, not a strategic transformation.

While political discourse focuses on whether Iran will return to the 2015 deal, a critical milestone is approaching: in October 2025, key provisions from UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, will expire. These are part of what is known as the “Sunset Clauses” – time-limited provisions that automatically lapse.

In practice, three critical components will expire:

1. End of restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program – currently there is a partial restriction urging Iran to refrain from developing missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Lifting it would officially allow Iran to advance long-range missile projects.
2. End of the ban on development, procurement, and testing of advanced uranium enrichment technologies – for example, advanced-generation centrifuges like IR-6 and IR-9. The lifting of restrictions would give Iran full legitimacy to develop an industrial infrastructure for very rapid enrichment.
3. End of limits on civilian nuclear trade – meaning Iran could, at least on paper, rejoin the international nuclear market, purchase equipment, export knowledge, and develop “civilian” nuclear programs on a significant scale, with little realistic oversight.

The Meaning of Non-Renewal

If these clauses expire without renewal or a new arrangement, the world will wake up to a reality where there are no longer significant legal obstacles preventing Iran from building a military nuclear infrastructure within mere weeks.

The danger is not theoretical. Iran already holds approximately 270 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent – a level with no civilian justification – and by some estimates, the time to reach weapons-grade (90 percent) is less than two weeks.

Additionally, lifting the restrictions will trigger a regional domino effect: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and possibly Egypt – all will see it as a green light to restart independent nuclear programs. The nuclear race in the Middle East – currently covert – will become overt, loud, and dangerous.

What Will Iran Do the Day After?

Given what we know about Iran’s modus operandi, we can assume it won’t immediately announce crossing the threshold. On the contrary – it will portray the new reality as a “legitimate,” “legal,” and “within its NPT rights” development. But beneath the surface, it will do what it has done before:

• Expand its advanced centrifuge systems.
• Increase enrichment rates to higher levels.
• Operate in facilities that are not always reported or fully monitored.
• Acquire ballistic capabilities allowing nuclear warhead delivery.

Trump, Witkoff, and the Situation on the Ground

The Iranians are closely monitoring developments in the United States. They detect weakness in the mediator – Witkoff – and observe how Trump is becoming increasingly consumed by domestic and global economic issues. Even his press conference with Netanyahu veered into these personal concerns. The feeling in Tehran is that Trump’s threats and initial firmness will eventually fade, and that the old deal can be reinstated with tweaks presented as an American win. Despite official denials, direct talks have already been underway for some time.

Beware of a “Diplomatic Achievement”

Within this whole dynamic, Israel may find itself in real danger. If a new nuclear deal is reached that is only slightly better than its predecessor – but framed as a “diplomatic achievement” by the West – the result could be a real existential threat to Israel and a victory for the Iran-led axis. Therefore, Israel must act decisively:

1. Influence Trump’s close advisers and senior Republicans – not just diplomatically, but through an explanatory campaign combining think tanks and covert actions.
2. Demand a clear deadline for negotiations. The agreement must be signed before October 2025.
3. Act to increase internal pressure within Iran as leverage on the regime.
4. Prevent any sanctions relief during the negotiations – not even gradually.
5. Insist on the complete dismantling of Iran’s enrichment project under American supervision.
6. Deliver a clear message to Iran that failure to reach an agreement will inevitably lead to attacks on oil and gas facilities and the collapse of the regime.
7. Prepare for the option of an independent Israeli strike if the agreement fails to meet Israel’s core demands.

History has shown again and again: Those who rely on the goodwill of totalitarian regimes often find themselves facing a fait accompli.

In Conclusion: When the Fish is Finally Caught

The Iranian regime operates from a place of isolation, siege mentality, and at times a deep persecution complex. The collapse of its proxy networks in the Middle East – Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and to a large extent Hamas – only increases the pressure. Yet none of this leads to ideological compromise, only tactical adaptation.

There are voices in Iran calling to confront the harsh reality – the drought, the poverty, the repression – and to reassess the path forward. But for now, like at that negotiation table in Kerman, they wait for the other side to tire first.

And the real question is: will the West fall once more into the trap of Persian patience? Or will we catch the fish – before it multiplies in the lake?